Lækket: Hemmeligt dokument afslører detaljer om kinesisk spionage

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Politik / Sikkerhedspolitik

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Kinesisk spionage er udbredt, og kineserne har en glubende appetit efter informationer. De bruger dog ikke spioner som russerne. Men mest af alt bruger de en hær af studenter, forretningsmænd og ansatte i virksomheder, som giver dem informationer om alt fra militære, politiske, tekniske, videnskabelige og forretningsmæssige emner. De er også gode til at indynde sig hos udlændinge, der er fascinerede af den kinesiske kultur og historie. Blandt andet med smiger, gode middage og rigelige mængder alkohol. Ofte over længere tid. Men kineserne er nu heller ikke blege for at bruge hverken afpresning eller aflytning.

Det er nogle af de konklusioner, som man kan læse i et dokument, der hedder JSP 440. Det er en forkortelse for “Joint Services Protocol 440”.

Det hemmeligtstemplede dokument på 2.389 sider er fra det britiske forsvarsministerium, og det er netop dukket op på Wikileaks. Du kan downloade det hele her som .pdf.

JSP 440 er den manual, som ifølge Wikileaks ligger til grund for al britisk efterretningstjeneste:

The document includes instructions on dealing with leaks, investigative journalists, Parliamentarians, foreign agents, terrorists & criminals, sexual entrapments in Russia and China, diplomatic pouches, allies, classified documents & codewords, compromising radio and audio emissions, computer hackers—and many other related issues.

Det er vanvittigt interessant at se, hvad briterne har at sige om kinesisk spionage og kineserne måde at arbejde på:

Chinese Intelligence Aims

3. Chinese intelligence activity is widespread and has a voracious appetite for all kinds of information; political, military,commercial, scientific and technical. It is on this area that the Chinese place their highest priority and where we assess that the greatest risk lies.

4. The Chinese have realised that it is not productive to simply steal technology and then try to `reverse engineer it’. Through intelligence activity they now attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of production te chniques and methodologies. There is an obvious economic risk to the UK. Our hard earned processes at very little cost and then reproduce them with cheap labour.

5. It is also, potentially, more serious than the above. In certain key military areas China is at least a generation behind the West. The Chinese may be able to acquire illegally the technology that will enable them to catch up. The real danger is that they will then produce advanced weapons systems which they will sell to unstable regimes. They have a track record of doing so. The consequences for the world’s trouble spots and any UK involvement there could be disastrous.

Characteristics of Chinese Intelligence Activity

6. Chinese intelligence activity is very different to the portrayal of `Moscow Rules’ in the novels of John Le Carre. The Chinese make no distinction between `information’ and `intelligence’. Their appetite for information, particularly in the scientific and technical field, is vast and indiscriminate. They do not `run agents’ they `make friends’. Although there are Chinese `intelligence officers’, both civilian and military, these fade into insignificance behind the mass of ordinary students, businessmen and locally employed staff who are working (at least part-time) on the orders of various parts of the State intelligence gathering apparatus.

Cultivation

7. The process of being cultivated as a `friend of China’ (ie. an `agent’) is subtle and long-term. The Chinese are adept at exploiting a visitor’s interest in, and appreciation of, Chinese history and culture. They are expert flatterers and are well aware of the `softening’ effect of food and alcohol. Under cover of consultation or lecturing, a visitor may be given favours, advantageous economic conditions or commercial opportunities. In return they will be expected to give information or access to material. Or, at the very least, to speak out on China’s behalf (becoming an `agent of influence’).

Locally Engaged Staff

8. Most companies operating in China are obliged to employ a number of locally engaged staff supplied by organisations such as the `Provincial Friendship Labour Services Corporation’. It is probable that the Chinese civilian intelligence service will have briefed such staff to copy all papers to which they are able to gain access. Many Chinese students and some businessmen also work to a brief from the Chinese intelligence services.

Technical Attacks

9. The Chinese intelligence services are known to employ telephone and electronic `bugs’ in hotels and restaurants. They have also been known to search hotel rooms and to use surveillance techniques against visitors of particular interest.

Compromise

10. The Chinese intelligence services have been known to use blackmail to persuade visitors to work for them. Sexual involvement should be avoided, as should any activity which can possible be construed as illegal. This would include dealing in black market currency or Chinese antiques and artefacts, straying into `forbidden’ areas or injudicious use of a camera or video recorder.”

:: Billedet viser ifølge Xinhua en hemmelig kinesisk agent (sådan næsten)

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Hurtige klik fra Kina af Kim Rathcke Jensen. Jeg er journalist og BA i kinesisk. Jeg bor i Beijing, hvor jeg arbejder som Politikens korrespondent i Kina og Asien.

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