Kan regeringen i Beijing holde sammen på Kina?
Et af problemerne er, at provinserne i de seneste par årtier er blevet stadig mere selvstændige. Blandt andet fordi de har fået ansvaret for deres egen økonomi.
Og går man ned i bunden af det statslige hierarki, hvor man finder landsbyerne, dukker der et nyt problem op. Her har centralregeringen stort set ingen magt. Landsbyerne er små kejserdømmer, der er kontrolleret af forskellige grupper, som har hver deres interesser.
I august rejste han en måned rundt til kinesiske landsbyer, og den tur skriver han om på Open Democracy:
… even in my brief and inevitably partial month-long journey, I was startled by how many village-level areas were lawless, ruled by different groups – and largely out of the reach of the central authorities.
In China’s northeast, quasi-mafia groups have made entire rural areas their fiefdoms, which they run according to their extensive business interests. In the southeast province of Fujian, similar elite economic groups have established control of villages via local representatives who ruthlessly pursue the groups’ private interests with no regard for broader social goals. In the central provinces of Hunan, Henan and Hebei, most evidence I saw showed a clear battle between party operatives and other increasingly powerful groups (from specific clans in one area, to economic or ethnic or social groups in another). Such tense and uneven situations help put in perspective Hu Jintao’s emphasis, in the aftermath of the Xinjiang disturbances, on the need to have “one law for everyone”.
In large swathes of the Chinese countryside, there seem to be as many different rules as their are groups. The strongest are taking what they want.
:: Privatfoto fra
et hul en landsby i Shanxi