Magtkamp i Kina: Opsamling og links

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Med Bo Xilais afgang er den politiske magtkamp brudt ud i lys lue. Det er den største ideologiske kamp i Kina i to årtier, der handler om den politiske og økonomiske kurs for Kina i de kommende år, og hvem der skal stå i spidsen for landet i det næste årti. Her er en hurtig opsamling med links. Du kan også læse den første opsamling, den anden og den tredje.

Wall Street Journal skriver om, hvordan censorerne kæmper mod de vilde rygter, der spreder sig på internettet, og hvorfor de dukker op.

The Communist Party’s grip on power depends in large part on maintaining a facade of unity, so the online rumor mill is clearly unsettling China’s propaganda officials and their armies of Internet censors. That is particularly true in the run-up to a once-a-decade leadership change scheduled to take place later this year.

Rumors of a power struggle also appeared to unsettle markets: Credit default swaps on China’s government debt—which offer a sort of insurance if China is unable to pay back its obligations—briefly rose on Tuesday before falling back to previous levels, according to a trader.

In the current overheated atmosphere, unexpected news is being parsed for political meaning. For instance, speculation has swirled about the identity of a man killed on Sunday morning when the Ferrari he was driving crashed into a bridge on a Beijing highway and shattered into pieces. Online rumors that the driver was the son of a high-level central-government official picked up steam after censors moved aggressively to quash discussion of the accident.

Bloomberg spørger, hvor Kinas røde Ferrari er på vej hen. For hvis ikke Wang Lijun var stukket af til det amerikanske konsulat i Chengdu i februar, så ville Bo Xilai måske stadig være ved magten. Så hvad siger det om kinesisk politik og Kinas Kommunistparti.

The real lesson of Bo’s downfall is that the Communist Party as a whole is losing its ability to stay on top of public disaffection with widespread corruption and rising inequality. Bo was able to tap that disaffection to fuel his political ascent (never mind that his own downfall was reportedly precipitated by his effort to quash an investigation of his own family). His popularity testifies not only to the level of public disgust, but also to the possibility of fissures within the ruling elite over the handling of such challenges.

The best remedy for corruption, of course, is sunlight. That’s never been one of the Communist Party’s likes, especially when it comes to corruption and wealth. In fact, a few days after Bo’s demotion, the authorities reportedly censored news of a grisly crash in Beijing involving a Ferrari, a favored ride of nouveau riche princelings (including Bo’s son). News of Bo’s removal was heavily controlled on the Internet, and new regulations have been put into place requiring microbloggers to register with their real identities. As political rumors ricocheted around the Internet earlier this week, they helped to spark the biggest rise in credit default swaps for Chinese bonds in four months.

Foreign Policy og Isaac Stone Fish skriver om, hvordan man følger med i magtkampen i Beijing. Det er ikke nemt.

Speculation is rife: A Canadian Chinese news portal quoted Deutsche Welle quoting the Hong Kong newspaper Apple Daily quoting a netizen that a group of citizens unfurled a banner in a main square in Chongqing that said “Party Secretary Bo, We Love and Esteem You,” and were subsequently taken away by plain-clothes security forces. A controversial Peking University professor Kong Qingdong, a 73rd generation descendant of Confucius, said on his television show that removing Bo Xilai is similar to “a counter-revolutionary coup;” one news site reported his show has since been suspended.

The Wall Street Journal reports that searching for Bo Xilai’s name on Baidu, China’s most popular search engine, lacks the standard censorship boilerplate (“according to relevant rules and regulations, a portion of the search results cannot be revealed”) that accompanies searching for top leaders like Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao. A recent search for other Politburo members like Bo rival Wang Yang and People’s Liberation Army top general Xu Caihou were similarly uncensored. Conversely, searching for Bo’s name on Sina’s popular Weibo micro-blogging service now doesn’t return any relevant results. A censored fatal Ferrari crash on Sunday night has raised suspicions of elite foul play, possibly realted to Bo. The reports that Hu and Zhou “are currently fighting for control of China Central Television, Xinhua News (the official Communist Party wire service), and other ‘mouthpieces,'” which have been eerily but unsurprisingly taciturn about Bo Xilai.

What we do know, as one message that bounced around Sina Weibo said, is that “something big happened in Beijing.”

Shanghaiist har oversat et stykke fra Yu Jie, der er forfatter til bogen om Wen Jiabao, der hedder “Kinas bedste skuespiller“, som skriver, at Kinas Kommunistparti er forstenet og sat på en kurs mod ødelæggelse.

“The fall of Bo Xilai, like the fall of the Gang of Four, was a non-normal process. It only goes to show that the Chinese Communist Party has failed to evolve even by a hair’s breadth over the last three decades. In countries under the rule of law, problematic officials are dealt with using legal measures. China, on the other hand, operates within the black box. Bo Xilai may not be evil, but his opponents Hu and Wen are no saints either. It gives me goosebumps to hear people like Wang Kang praising Wen, like someone has just let off a foul odour.

“The battle between Wen and Bo is a battle between an evil and a worse evil. I can’t understand why some so-called independent intellectuals would applaud these developments on the sidelines. Of course, the intensified infighting within the Chinese Communist Party is just another sign that it’s on that path of destruction. Bo has made a significant contribution in this respect.”


Hurtige klik fra Kina af Kim Rathcke Jensen. Jeg er journalist og BA i kinesisk. Jeg bor i Beijing, hvor jeg arbejder som Politikens korrespondent i Kina og Asien.

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