Magtkamp i Kina: Opsamling og links

Skriv en kommentar

Med Bo Xilais afgang er den politiske magtkamp brudt ud i lys lue. Det er den største ideologiske kamp i Kina i to årtier, der handler om den politiske og økonomiske kurs for Kina i de kommende år, og hvem der skal stå i spidsen for landet i det næste årti. Her er en hurtig opsamling med links. Du kan også læse den første opsamling, anden og tredje og fjerde.

Wall Street Journal kommer med en af dagens mærkeligste historier om magtkampen. Det viser sig, at viceborgmester Wang Lijun, der var ansvarlig for politiet i Chongqing, og som startede lavinen, der skyllede Bo Xilai ud af partitoppen, har registreret 150 patenter. Fra regnfrakker til kvindelige betjente, boghylder og et bord til hot-pot.

The patents, most of which are for police equipment, range from raincoats for female officers to the exterior design of an all-terrain counterterrorist attack vehicle, according to China Intellectual Property Net,, a Chinese government-backed website.

Wang Lijun is a relatively common Chinese name, but most of the patents also mention the Chongqing Public Security Bureau.

The vast majority were granted after Mr. Wang’s appointment as Chongqing police chief in 2008, although a handful date back to his time in Jinzhou city in northeastern China.

CNN’s Bill Powell, der blandt mødte Bo Xilai i 2001, spørger, hvordan Bo kunne gå fra at være en liberal guvernør og senere erhvervsminister, der talte om reformer, til at blive neo-maoist og gloende rød kommunist?

Bo Xilai is what’s known in China as a “princeling,” the son of one of the so-called “eight immortals,” Bo Yibo, who fought with Mao during the revolution. During the cultural revolution, the younger Bo joined a hard line faction, but was then imprisoned after the Gang of Four went after his father. He spent four years in prison. “He started as a victimizer and ended up a victim,” as Kerry Brown, director of the China Center at the University of Sydney wrote in a recent essay. As such, it’s hard to see how he could really be a big fan of that era.

His embrace by China’s left comes from his stint as party secretary in Chongqing. There, the charismatic party secretary — the only senior politician in China to whom that adjective can be reasonably attached — portrayed himself as a champion of the poor, decried the increasing gap between rich and poor, and backed up the rhetoric by increasing the amount of housing available to low income citizens. He also encouraged citizens to sing “patriotic” Mao-era songs in public parks, which became a popular thing to do among those of a certain age. While controversial, this hardly seemed the stuff of a new cultural revolution, and few meanwhile would argue his economic policies (however successful they may or may not have been) didn’t highlight legitimate issues in today’s China. To the contrary, they absolutely did.

Los Angeles Times peger på, at det er vilde rygter, som flyder ud af Beijing lige nu. Om kup og militære køretøjer og skyderi i gaderne. Det er overdrevet, men det er de politiske spændinger ikke.

State media reported this week that 3,300 party cadres from the security apparatus would be sent to Beijing for ideological retraining. The order was unusual enough, but even more so was the fact that the report omitted mention of internal security czar Zhou Yongkang, who heads the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee that is recalling the cadres.

Zhou, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and until now one of the most powerful men in China, had been the committee’s strongest backer of Bo Xilai, the Communist Party secretary of Chongqing who was removed from his post last week. Some overseas Chinese-language Internet sites carried wild (and unsubstantiated) rumors that Zhou and Bo, a popular figure among Maoist traditionalists, had tried to stage a coup.

A level of edginess was apparent this week in the unusually large security presence in central Beijing, complete with armed SWAT teams in some subway stations.

Jin Zhong, a veteran political analyst based in Hong Kong, dismissed the more fantastic rumors, while acknowledging the underlying tension between economic reformers and Maoist traditionalists.

“It hasn’t reached the point where you are going to hear gunshots. It is not like when China arrested the Gang of Four in 1976, but there is a very strong conflict going on,” Jin said.

BusinessWeek citerer økonomen Stephen Green fra Standard Chartered for, at debatten om Kinas økonomiske fremtid bliver vild. Magtkampen om Bo Xlai handler nemlig også om Kinas økonomiske fremtid og de to vidt forskellige modeller i Chongqing og Guangdong. Det burde efterhånden være klart for alle nu. Men vi tager den en gang til.

The back-and-forth focuses on two models. The Chongqing model calls for a top-down push for social equality, with a stronger role for government in the economy; its name evokes the giant southwestern city where Bo Xilai ran the show until early March. The other model plays down the role of state companies, encourages the growth of more capital-intensive, value-added industries, and favors grassroots political reform. This is the Guangdong approach, named for the coastal province that was first to grow rich on exports and now is a center for experiments in governance. “I am strongly supportive of the Guangdong model and wary of the Chongqing model,” wrote Tsinghua University sociologist Sun Liping on March 16 in the Beijing-based business weekly Economic Observer. “In the long term, it is more important that the masses have the right to struggle for their own interests.”

Bloomberg har interview med Zhang Xin, der er CEO for en af de største ejendoms developers i Kina. Han mener, at Bo Xilai’s exit er et farvel til den kinesiske statskapitalisme.

Bo Xilai’s ouster last week as head of Chongqing is a signal that China will increase the role of private businesses in the economy and scale back state capitalism, said Zhang Xin, Chief Executive Officer of Soho China Ltd.

Zhang, whose company is the biggest property developer in Beijing’s central business district, said yesterday on the Charlie Rose show that Bo’s ouster and comments made last week by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao about continuing economic opening are signals that the model focusing on state-directed bank lending and state-owned companies will fade.

“I think that was quite a worry for a number of years but by now it seems to be cleared,” Zhang said, according to a transcript of the interview.


Hurtige klik fra Kina af Kim Rathcke Jensen. Jeg er journalist og BA i kinesisk. Jeg bor i Beijing, hvor jeg arbejder som Politikens korrespondent i Kina og Asien.

Skriv et svar

Din e-mailadresse vil ikke blive publiceret. Krævede felter er markeret med *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.