Den 18. partikongres er forbi, og nu er det tid til at få overblikket. Her får du links, opsummering og analyser om partikongressen og de nye ledere.
Reuters konkluderer, at Kinas magtfulde politi- og sikkerhedsvæsen har fået en lussing. Det viser udnævnelsen af Meng Jianzhu, der er et forsøg på at stække sikkerhedsapparatets magt, som er vokset markant siden 2007.
The official Xinhua news agency said in a brief announcement that Zhou Yongkang’s position as head of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, a sprawling body that oversees law-and-order policy, had been taken over by Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu.
Meng, however, is only a member of the new Politburo, the 25-member body which reports to the down-sized Standing Committee, putting him on a tighter leash and returning to a pattern the party kept to for much of the 1980s.
In another announcement, Xinhua said that Zhao Leji had replaced Li Yuanchao as head of the party’s organization department that oversees the appointment of senior party, government, military and state-owned enterprise officials.
Zhao had been party boss of the northern province of Shaanxi and is close to president-in-waiting Xi.
There was no announcement on where Li, a reformer who has courted foreign investment and studied in the United States, may go. He missed out on a spot on the Standing Committee despite being tipped to enter it.
Bloomberg har fundet både kikkert og spåkugle frem. Her ved partikongressen blev der udpeget den femte generation af ledere, hvoraf mange kommer til at sidde frem til 2023. Men allerede nu er afløserne og den sjette generation ved at blive kørt i stilling. Altså de folk, der skal overtage Kina i 2032.
Sun Zhengcai, Communist Party boss of Jilin province and former agriculture minister, was named to the 25-member Politburo yesterday along with Hu Chunhua, the party secretary of Inner Mongolia. The two, who are both 49 years old, could succeed China’s new leaders in 2022, said Joseph Cheng, a political science professor at the City University of Hong Kong. They are the youngest members of the new Politburo by at least six years.
“Their mentality is quite different,” said Zheng Yongnian, director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore. Hu, Sun and other younger party cadres were educated during China’s “best decade” of political opening, which ended with the government’s 1989 crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests, Zheng said.
Guardian har også kigget nærmere på den unge generation af politikere. Og her peger analytikere på, at man ikke engang ved den sjette generation af ledere skal forvente de store ændringer. Og under alle omstændigheder – som altid med kinesisk politik – vil det være nærmest umuligt at finde ud af, hvad de reelt står for:
Bo Zhiyue, an expert on Chinese politics at the National University of Singapore, said that today’s party elites may be more cautious in grooming their successors. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang leapfrogged to the politburo standing committee five years ago without first sitting on the 25-member politburo, he said.
“I think these people will have to be placed in provincial leadership positions for another four or five years before they move to the central leadership,” said Bo. “They need to gain additional local experience.”
Willy Lam, a Chinese politics expert at the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, wrote that incentive systems laid out by Hu Jintao make it unlikely that the sixth generation would enact real political change. Third-generation leaders such as Deng Xiaoping strived to strike a balance between professional competence and communist zeal, he wrote in a 2010 report called Changing of the Guard. Yet Hu has unwaveringly given priority to “morality,” party-speak for devotion, above other qualities.
Analysts say that it may not be possible to truly gauge sixth generation leaders’ potential to join the standing committee for years.
“Some of them will make it but they’ll have to toe the new line and show their faithfulness to Xi Jinping and the new leadership,” said Jean-Pierre Cabestan, a professor at Hong Kong Baptist University.
Caixin har – via en oversættelse på Chinafile – en noget positiv leder om sproget i partkongressens rapport, og hvad det betyder for politiske refomer.
The fact that the party congress report contains the idea sends a clear signal that there is no question about the necessity of political reform. What is open for discussion now is how current institutions can reform. People who care about political reform must pinpoint the trends and ride the tide.
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping (front), delivers a speech as (left to right) Liu Yunshan, Zhang Dejiang, Li Keqiang, Yu Zhengsheng, and Wang Qishan listen in the Great Hall of the People on November 15, 2012.
The core of political reform is democracy, and the key to its development will be strategic institutions that support this paradigm. Under the current political framework, the congress report highlighted two points: Make sure people exert power via the people’s congress, and improve the political consultancy mechanism.
It seems cliché that whenever officials talk about democracy, what follows next is mention of the people’s congress. But this time, there was more substance to their words. Unlike previous party congress reports, the latest document said legislators should enhance their supervision over government operations, as well as government budget and spending reviews, including off-book revenues. Implementing this by next year, when the next National People’s Congress convenes, would mark significant progress toward introducing democratic processes to fiscal policymaking.
East Asia Forum peger også på, at jo, der vil komme økonomiske reformer, men det er ikke det samme som politiske:
Some of the disappointment about the new group is that the two most likely advocates of serious political reform, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, didn’t make it to the PBSC. But you’d have to be beyond optimistic to believe the Chinese Communist Party’s top leadership is at all serious about democratisation. That is not on the cards no matter who is in the Politburo. There’s not a Gorbachev among them. We’ll see a range of reforms to improve how this system works (budget transparency, income reporting, more efforts to rein in corruption), but all of these tactics are being done to make this system work better, not prepare China to move toward another (multi-party democratic) system. If you’re sceptical they can make this system work better, they’re going to try and prove everyone wrong. Either they’ll succeed, or there will be a political meltdown.
Politiken og jeg selv skrev, at en af de mange grunde til manglen på reformer er, at de gamle og pensionerede ledere stadig spøger i partiet, og at de har haft stor indflydelse på magtskiftet og i at udpege de nye folk.
Det er en gruppe af cirka 20 tidligere højtstående ledere i partiet, der i dag er over 70 år gamle, og som officielt er gået på pension. Men de er stadig magtfulde.
»De er aktive i politik, selvom der er forskel på deres engagement«, siger Wu Qiang, der er ekspert i kinesisk politik på Tsinghua University i Beijing.
»I Kina er det uigennemskueligt, hvordan man bliver forfremmet, og man skal ikke underkende indflydelsen af de personlige netværk. De er vigtigere end både politiske præstationer og institutionaliserede karriereveje«, siger Wu Qiang.
En af de mest fremtrædende af ”de gamle” er tidligere generalsekretær og præsident, Jiang Zemin, der er 86 år. I flere år har han været væk fra offentligheden, men i de seneste måneder er han dukket op ved flere lejligheder. Det er et signal til omverdenen om, at han stadig har indflydelse og er ved godt helbred.
De gamle og deres netværk er ekstremt vigtigt for beskyttelse og forfremmelse af højtstående ledere, siger ekspert i kinesisk politik, Feng Chongyi, der er fra University of Technology i Sydney.
»Der er stærke fælles interesser mellem beskyttere og deres klienter. Jiang og de ældre kæmper desperat for at støtte deres protegeer«, siger Feng.
Flere analytikere er blevet overraskede over, hvor stor indflydelse de ældre har haft på magtskiftet denne gang. Kina har brugt 20 år på at institutionalisere magten, men det har ikke virket. Og det kan være farligt, når Kina står overfor så massive udfordringer som nu.
»Det er med til at lamme hele systemet. Jo flere personlige interesser, der skal tilgodeses, jo sværere er det at ændre systemet og gennemføre dristige refomer«, siger Jean-Pierre Cabestan, der forsker i kinesisk politik på Hong Kong Baptist University.
Jamestown Foundation og Willy Lam skriver også om de gamle ledere, og hvordan deres magt og partikongressen i det hele taget var udtryk for et tilbageslag for politiske reformer.
The appearance of the octogenarian and nonagenarian cadres was not just a symbolic gesture to demonstrate party unity. At least a couple of these past state leaders have played the role of kingmaker in the choice of PBSC members this year. For example, three of the seven members of the 18th PBSC are believed to be protégés of Jiang, who still heads the Shanghai Faction in party politics. They are new General Secretary Xi Jinping, who owed his promotion to the PBSC in 2007 to Jiang’s nomination; the soon-to-be-named Chairman of the National People’s Congress Chairman Zhang Dejiang; and the Executive Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat Liu Yunshan. Jiang and former Premier Li Peng, 84, were instrumental in preventing two of Hu’s cronies, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, from making it to the PBSC. Both Li and Wang, who have reformist reputations, have managed only to hang on to their Politburo seats. Wang, age 57, the outgoing Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, is set to become a vice premier in March (Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 8; Sing Tao Daily [Hong Kong], November 8).
The New Yorker og Evan Osnos har en god kommentar om den tale, som Xi Jinping holdt i sidste uge, da han præsenterede Politbureauets Stående Udvalg. For selvom man ikke skal håbe på hverken hurtige eller markante reformer, så har den nye generalsekretær en ny stil, der er langt fra Hu Jintaos kommunistiske kanonkugler og hans hjernefrysende kedelige optræden.
His speech was no barn burner, but it was refreshingly free of Party hymns. He never mentioned the harmonious society, or Jiang Zemin’s tortured locution, “the three represents.” Instead, he referred so often to “the people” that it seems destined to become a watchword of his tenure. “It is the people who have created history,” he said, “and it is the people who are true heroes. The people are the source of our strength.”
Those gestures of populist sensibility—the sense that, like it or not, the Party must figure out a way to be responsive—stand out especially because they are at odds with the credentials of the men that Xi will have by his side. Xi did not choose them exactly; they are a compromise between powerful families and factions. And when the members were unveiled, their composition confirmed what pundits had predicted: reform-minded candidates had been sidelined. Instead, the Party chose some of its most ardent conservatives. One is a seasoned propagandist. Another received his economics training in North Korea. They were so faithful to precedent that all but one wore a nearly identical dark suit and red tie. After months of secretive politicking over questions of reform and legitimacy, the Party seems to have sided with what one politics-watcher called the “unwritten party rule which favored seniority over competence.”
New York Times Dealbook og den altid skarpe Bill Bishop mener, at Xi Jiinping som en af de første opgaver vil kaste sig over korruption. Men det kan blive svært.
MR. XI APPEARS TO BE STARTING HIS RULE by signaling a possible crackdown on corruption. Chinese officials have made lots of anti-corruption noise over the last few years, even as graft has spread like a cancer through society, but Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption rhetoric is more dire and aggressive. By making such a big deal of it so early in his term, he risks quickly destroying any good will and credibility if he does not show results, though more high-profile corruption cases could be equally damaging. There are some who would argue that any crackdown might be too late as the system may now be so rotten that a serious crackdown on venality would destroy it.