Neo-maoisme: Mao Zedong opdateret til 2013

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Kinesisk propaganda / Politik

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Formand Mao Zedong er ved at blive opdateret til 2013. For eksempel er der en stærkt opdateret udgave af den Lille Røde på vej, som jeg skriver her.

Men hvad er den kinesiske neo-maoisme? I Vesten er der ofte et karikeret og sort-hvidt billede af Mao, som Civil China skriver her:

But Mao’s legacy in China has hardly been as cut-and-dry as it is in the West, and his resurging popularity highlights some of modern China’s most glaring contradictions.

With significant economic inequality, rampant corruption, and profound social changes, Chinese people remember Mao as the last leader who supported the masses. Compared with today’s CCP officials, who have reputations for being simultaneously bland and treacherous, Mao’s fiery rhetoric is finding new traction. Mao Zedong Thought is widely quoted on Weibo when people discuss the current Chinese situation, with many netizens saying that Mao had deep insight into China’s reality. And ironically, many borrow Mao’s quotes to provide legitimacy for reforms, such as citing Mao the constitutionalist, who once proposed to build an American-style democracy in China.

Even as neo-Maoists selectively rebuild the Chairman’s image into a current rallying cry, their opponents are ever eager to point out the other side: Chinese liberals frequently cite the abuses of power associated with Mao’s personality cult and dispute claims that he scourged corruption. Current CCP leaders walk a fine line: on the one hand, they need to maintain Mao’s reputation as a founder and pay due respect in order to maintain their own ruling legitimacy. President Xi Jinping, for example, made a high-profile speech on Mao early this year, emphasizing that to deny Mao equals to deny history, leadership of CCP and socialist system. Xi himself has also evoked Mao in his anti-corruption crackdown, especially his recently launched rectification campaign. But at the same time, the government pays close attention to neo-Maoist activities, strictly controlling the scale of Mao-related commemoration activities and even shutting down main propaganda websites [] and detaining key activists. The government vows to inherit Mao’s political legacy while indulging all kinds of anti-Maoism expression; in today’s China, one is more likely to get in trouble with the censors for being more pro-Mao than anti-Mao.

Willy Lam skriver på China Brief om Xi Jinpings ideologiske kampagne og neo-maoisme. Hele artiklen er værd at læse. Her er et uddrag:

Xi’s apparent return to Maoist-style dogma has been affirmed by a number of party mouthpieces. “Dangxing is the [result of the] refinement, sublimation and synthesis of human nature,” said an article carried by the Study Times, a mouthpiece of the Central Party School. For Beijing-based liberal scholar Mou Chuanheng, however, Xi was using high-sounding and politically correct language to circumvent tough questions of political reform, which have been mothballed for more than 20 years. “Xi Jinping is using the construction of dangxing to side-step the construction of constitutional governance,” Mou wrote. “He has also advocated rectifying the party’s style to substitute changes of institutions” (Study Times, August 20; Open Magazine [Hong Kong], September 1). Alfred Wu, a Chinese politics specialist at the Hong Kong Institute of Education, noted that Xi had embraced Maoist ideals and put political reform on indefinite hold. “Xi might want to appeal to hard-line elements in the party so as to firm up his own power base,” he said (Author’s interview with Dr. Wu, September 15).

Theoretical issues aside, what are the practical implications of Xi’s apparent attempt to turn back the clock? While the president’s Rectification Campaign has been interpreted as a call for loyalty to cadres with “revolutionary bloodline,” the ideological exercise serves a similar purpose of rallying support around the central authorities—and in particular, around Xi himself (See “Rectification Campaign to Boost Cadres with “‘Red DNA’,” China Brief, Vol. 13, Issue 14). Not long after Xi’s August 19 speech, Beijing party secretary Guo Jinlong published an article in the party’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth entitled “Ensure that the central authorities’s political orders are smoothly enforced; Our political beliefs must remain unchanged under any circumstances.” Jin called on his colleagues in the Beijing municipality to “always maintain a high degree of unison in terms of ideas and action with the party central authorities with comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary.” “We must self-consciously protect the authority of the central authorities,” he added (Xinhua, September 2; Seeking Truth, September 1).

:: Foto fra Xinhua. Hvert år til nationaldagen den 1. oktober bliver portrættet af Mao, der hænger ved indgangen til Den Forbudte By på Den Himmelske Fredsplads, udskiftet med et nyt.


Hurtige klik fra Kina af Kim Rathcke Jensen. Jeg er journalist og BA i kinesisk. Jeg bor i Beijing, hvor jeg arbejder som Politikens korrespondent i Kina og Asien.

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